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THE HEARSAY RULE: ARE TELEPHONE CALLS INTERCEPTED
BY POLICE ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE THE TRUTH
OF MATTERS IMPLIEDLY ASSERTED?
United States v. Lewis,
902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Long,
905 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. These rules are the
culmination of a long process of work by lawyers, judges, scholars, and Congress.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 deals with hearsay which it defines as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, of-
fered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'
With the decisions in United States v. Lewis2 and United States v. Long,3 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether telephone calls intercepted by police from unknown callers
were admissible over hearsay objections. The probative value of the telephone
calls as relevant evidence depended on the truth of the matter impliedly asserted in
the calls.
1. FED. R. EvID. 801(c). All of the Federal Rules of Evidence may be found at FED. R. EvID., 28 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 1991). In its entirety, Rule 801 provides:
Rule 801. Definitions
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct ofa person, if it is
intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if -
(1) Prior statement by witness. -The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testi-
mony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut
an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or mo-
tive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. -The statement is offered against a party and is (A) party's own
statement in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concern-
ing a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relation-
ship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
FED. R. EvID. 801.
2. 902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990).
3. 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 365 (1990).
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This note analyzes the treatment of implied assertions within common law
hearsay views and under Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This note also
analyzes whether the decisions in Lewis and Long can be reconciled with the pur-
pose of the hearsay rule.
II. FACTS
A. United States v. Lewis
In United States v. Lewis,' the United States Postal Inspection Service, acting on
an internal warning that a parcel containing suspected non-mailable materials
would be arriving in Jackson, Mississippi, via Express Mail, intercepted a pack-
age containing approximately 237 grams of crack cocaine. After examining the
contents, the Postal Service prepared the package for a controlled delivery by sub-
stituting paraffin wax for the crack cocaine. I
Following delivery, federal and state officers kept the addressee's apartment un-
der surveillance until co-defendants Wade and Lewis were arrested and charged
with conspiracy, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and use of the
mails to facilitate the conspiracy.6 At the time of the arrest, the police seized each
defendant's electronic pager. One of the pagers began beeping while in the custody
of the police. A police officer called the number displayed on the beeper and iden-
tified himself as one of the defendants. The unidentified person on the other end of
the call asked the police officer, (1) "Did you get the stuff?," and (2) "Where is
Dog?" The police officer then tried to arrange a meeting with the unidentified per-
son, but no one showed up at the arranged time.7
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Wade's conviction and sentence 8
but reversed Lewis' conviction because of insufficient evidence. 9 The court held
"that because the questions asked by the unknown caller were not assertions, the
questions were not hearsay .... ""
B. United States v. Long
In United States v. Long, 1 pursuant to a valid search warrant, several Washing-
ton, D.C. police officers raided an apartment whose lessee12 was a suspect in drug-
related activities. The police arrested defendant Keith Long along with the lessee
of the apartment and two other individuals who were found in the apartment. The
4. 902 F2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990).
5. "The suspect package was addressed to 'Nicole Harris' at an address in Ridgeland, Mississippi. The evi-
dence later revealed that no one named 'Nicole Harris' resided at the listed address. Rather, the apartment was




9. Id. at 1181-82.
10. Id. at 1179. The court also held Wade guilty of possession of cocaine since "a co-conspirator had posses-
sion of the cocaine in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. at 1181.
11. 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
12. Sonia Mayfield was the lessee of the apartment. Id. at 1575.
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search yielded rock cocaine, drug paraphernalia, cocaine in powder form, a large
amount of cash, and an unloaded revolver. Long was convicted of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm.'3
During the search of the apartment, the police answered a telephone call. The
caller asked to speak to "Keith" and then asked whether Keith "still had any stuff."
When asked what the caller meant, she responded "a fifty." The substance of this
telephone call was admitted over Long's hearsay objection. 4 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Long's narcotics conviction but re-
versed his firearms conviction."5 The court held that "[b]ecause the caller's
questions were nonassertive, they fall outside the scope of the hearsay
rule .... ""
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Anglo-American judicial system developed three conditions for testimony
to induce witnesses to be accurate and to expose any inaccuracies in sincerity, per-
ception, memory or narration. 7 Those conditions are: oath, personal presence at
the trial, and cross-examination." Testimony about an out of court declarant's
statement that does not meet these conditions is subject to exclusion as hearsay.
"The primary reason for excluding hearsay is that the trier of fact has no adequate
basis for evaluating the declarant's credibility, because the declarant was not sub-
ject to cross-examination under oath in the trier's presence." 9
A. Common Law
The history of the hearsay rule as a distinct common law rule began in the
1500's and gained a complete development and final precision in the early
1700's.2" "No precise date or ruling stands out as decisive; but between 1675 and
1690. . . the fixing of the doctrine [took] place."2' During the period in which
the adversary system became established, the courts adopted the rule excluding
hearsay.22
Before the opening of the eighteenth century, then, we find three reasons ad-
vanced for excluding hearsay. The court and the jury must base their finding upon
13. Sonia Mayfield was also convicted of the same charges as Long. Id. at 1573-75.
14. Id. at 1579.
15. Mayfield's appeal was not properly before the court due to late filing of the appeal in violation of FED. R.
App. P. 4(b). Id. at 1574-75.
16. Id. at 1580. The court also held that a firearms conviction must be supported by evidence that shows a
reasonable inference that the accused used the revolver. Id. at 1576.
17. C. McColtsslCK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 726-27 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Mc-
CORMICK].
18. Id. at 727.
19. R. Park, 7 Didn't Tell Them Anything About You" Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REv. 783, 785 (1990) [hereinafter Park].
20. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364, at 12 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974).
21. Id. at 18.
22. E. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 181
(1948) [hereinafter Morgan].
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what the witness knows and not upon what he is credulous enough to believe; the
witness must make that knowledge known under sanction of fear of the conse-
quences which falsehood will bring; and the adversary must have an opportunity to
cross-examine. 2
• . . [In modern common law], the notion that the court and jury cannot be per-
mitted to rely upon the possible credulity of the witness seems to have gone by the
board, for unless the adversary objects, the court may admit inadmissible hearsay
and the trier of fact may give it such value as is within the bounds of reason. The
trier has the right to only such protection from this pitfall as the adversary sees fit to
insist upon.24
At common law, the hearsay rule was applied only to out-of-court statements
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.25 Case law conflicts on whether
the hearsay rule applies to implied assertions. An out-of-court statement is an im-
plied assertion if the trier is being asked to infer a fact from the declarant's utter-
ance. "The utterance containing the implied assertion does not directly assert the
proposition it is offered to prove. "26
A good starting point for any discussion of implied assertions is the durable case
of Wright v. Tatham.27 The case illustrates how verbal and nonverbal conduct can
contain implied assertions and how a declarant's implied assertions can pose hear-
say dangers when used as evidence.28
In Wright v. Tatham, Baron Parke stated: [P]roof of a particular fact, which is
not of itself a matter in issue, but which is relevant only as implying a statement or
opinion of a third person on the matter in issue, is inadmissible in all cases where
such a statement or opinion not on oath would be of itself inadmissible .... 29
This dictum has carried great weight and can be traced through numerous com-
mon law cases up to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence by Congress in
1975.0
Wright v. Tatham involved a will contest between the heir at law and the benefi-
ciary under the will. The competency of the decedent was at issue in an effort to
void the will. In support of the decedent's competency, the beneficiary offered into
evidence several letters that third persons had written to the decedent. 31
These letters were written in language suggesting the writers believed the dece-
dent was mentally competent, and the beneficiary offered them to show that the
decedent was in fact mentally competent. The beneficiary wanted the trier to infer
23. Id. at 182-83.
24. Id. at 183.
25. United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 465 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
26. Park, supra note 19, at 788.
27. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch. 1837).
28. Park, supra note 19, at 788.
29. Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 1974)(citing Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516-17
(Ex. Ch. 1837)).
30. 0. Wellborn, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 Tx. L. REv. 49, 57-58 (1982)
[hereinafter Wellborn].
31. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 489-93.
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from the writer's belief in the decedent's competence that the decedent was in fact
competent. 32 The court held the letters to be hearsay.
The probative value of the letters depended on the sincerity and credibility of
the declarant letter writers.
"Wright v. Tatham . . . illustrates how implied assertions derived from verbal
conduct can involve hearsay dangers. The use of the letters to [the decedent] requires
an inference from the declarant's statement to the declarant's belief to the truth of the
belief, so use involves reliance on the declarant's credibility."34
The hearsay dangers of sincerity, narration/ambiguity, perception, and memory
are the primary justifications for excluding evidence when "cross-examination is
not available to help evaluate the strength of the inferences from the out-of-court
declarant's words to the declarant's belief to the 'truth' of what happened in the real
world.
From Wright v. Tatham, two views developed concerning whether implied as-
sertions fell within the hearsay exclusionary rule. Professor Morgan, a leading
proponent of one view, would include implied assertions within the hearsay rule in
that "the rational basis for the hearsay classification is not the formula, 'assertions
offered for the truth of the matter asserted,' but rather the presence of substantial
risks of insincerity and faulty narration, memory, and perception[.]" 36 Morgan's
comprehensive definition of hearsay includes:
(1) all conduct of a person, verbal or nonverbal, intended by him to operate as an
assertion when offered either to prove the truth of the matter asserted or to prove that
the asserter believed the matter asserted to be true, and (2) all conduct of a person,
verbal or nonverbal, not intended by him to operate as an assertion, when offered
either to prove both his state of mind and the external event or condition which
caused him to have that state of mind, or to prove that his state of mind was truly
reflected by that conduct.
3 7
Thus, if Proponent is seeking to prove that X forged a will, each of the following
utterances of Declarant to X must be treated as if it were a direct accusation of for-
gery by X: "When do you plan to forge another kinsman's will?"; Well, I never
forged a kinsman's will, anyway!" There is, and can be, no debate as to the classifi-
cation of any of these utterances. They are hearsay by the strictest definition. 3
Therefore, the Morgan view is triggered by conduct. If the trier of fact has to
rely on the declarant's state of mind to interpret his statement, then that statement
is hearsay.39 The hearsay dangers of perception, memory, narration/ambiguity,
32. Park, supra note 19, at 789.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 791 (emphasis in original).
35. R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 300 (1989).
36. Morgan, supra note 22, at 218.
37. E. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1138, 1144-45 (1935).
38. Morgan, supra note 22, at 189.
39. Id. at 179.
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and sincerity are involved; yet, the declarant is not subject to cross-examination to
expose any inaccuracies in his statement."
Numerous courts have adopted the Morgan view and have held that implied as-
sertions were hearsay and therefore not admissible unless there was an exception
to the hearsay rule. The United States Supreme Court in Krulewitch v. United
States41 held that a statement 42 which implied that the defendant was guilty of the
crime for which he was on trial was hearsay and therefore not admissible.' The
case involved an alleged conspiracy to transport a woman for the purpose of prosti-
tution. 44 The hearsay statement was made by an alleged co-conspirator to the pros-
ecution witness and implied that the defendant was guilty of the crime. 4' The
Court then evaluated whether the hearsay statement was admissible under the co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule and concluded that since the statement
was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy, it would not be admissible under
that exception.46
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an implied assertion
was hearsay in Park v. Huff47 The sole evidence against the defendant was a state-
ment8 by an alleged co-conspirator implicating the defendant as the person behind
the conspiracy to murder a prosecuting attorney.' 9 The prosecuting attorney had
been murdered on the day he was to present evidence against a liquor conspiracy
to a grand jury in which the defendant had been implicated.5" The court held that
"[w]hen the possibility is real that an out-of-court statement which implies the ex-
istence of the ultimate fact in issue was made with assertive intent, it is essential
that the statement be treated as hearsay if a direct declaration of that fact would be
so treated." 1 The court then evaluated whether the hearsay statements were ad-
missible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule and concluded on
rehearing en banc that they were."
The court in Park stated that Professor Morgan identified the rationale of the
hearsay rule as based on the untrustworthiness of hearsay statements.53 "Implied
assertions may in certain circumstances carry less danger of insincerity or untrust-
40. Id. at 178.
41. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
42. "It would be better for us two girls to take the blame than Kay (the defendant) because he couldn't stand it,
he couldn't stand to take it." Id. at 441.
43. Id. at 442-43.
44. Id. at 441.
45. Id. at 442.
46. Id. at 443-44.
47. 493 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974), reh'g granted, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975).
48. A co-conspirator told a prosecution witness that a man wanted the prosecuting attorney done away with
and that he was willing to pay $5,000. "[Tlhe old man won't go up anymore" and if the alleged co-conspirator did
not go through with the killing, the "old man" would have "something done" to him or his family. Id. at 925-26.
(The defendant was known as "old man" in the community).
49. Id. at 925.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 928.
52. Park v. Huff, 506 E2d 849 (5th Cir. 1975).
53. Park v. Huff, 493 F2d 923, 927 (5th Cir. 1974).
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worthiness than direct assertions, . . . but not always. The danger of insincerity
or untrustworthiness is decreased only where there is no possibility that the de-
clarant intended to leave a particular impression." 4 It follows from this analysis
that if the trier must infer a proposition by using an utterance as indirect evidence
of a belief or state of mind of the declarant, then the hearsay dangers of perception,
memory, narration/ambiguity, and sincerity are present; thus, the utterance
should be excluded by the hearsay rule.
Professor McCormick was the leading proponent of the opposing common law
view of the status of implied assertions under the hearsay rule. McCormick's view
would not include implied assertions within the hearsay rule. Under the McCor-
mick view, conduct, verbal or nonverbal, is hearsay only if it is specifically in-
tended as an assertion." "If the statement is not an assertion or is not offered to
prove the facts asserted, it is not hearsay. "56 "[Tihe out-of-court assertion is not
hearsay if offered as proof of something other than the matter asserted."
5 7
The following illustrates Professor McCormick's view: In a hypothetical set-
ting, on a theory of liability asserting that a defendant was driving his car while
intoxicated, plaintiff presents evidence that defendant was at a party, alcohol was
served at the party, and defendant drank some of the alcohol. In addition, plaintiff
calls witness to the stand to testify that shortly before defendant left the party, he
overheard two of defendant's friends respond to questions of whether they would
be riding home with the defendant. One friend responded "I'd rather walk home
than ride with anyone as drunk as [the defendant]." The other friend responded,
"I'd rather crawl home on my hands and knees." Under the McCormick view, the
first response would be hearsay, although probably within a hearsay exception,
since it would be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that the defend-
ant was drunk. The second response would not be hearsay because it isn't offered
to prove the truth of the matter explicitly asserted therein, "I'd rather crawl home
on my hands and knees." It is being offered to prove the truth of the matter im-
pliedly asserted therein, that the defendant was too drunk to drive.'
The second response in the hypothetical, "I'd rather crawl home on my hands
and knees," is a good example of an implied assertion in that the trier is being
asked to infer a fact from the declarant's utterance. This utterance does not directly
assert that the defendant is drunk, which is what the statement is being offered to
prove. Therefore, under an assertion-based hearsay rule, an utterance offered to
prove the truth of the matter impliedly asserted therein is not hearsay. s
54. Id.
55. McCoRMICK, supra note 17, § 249 at 732.
56. Id.
57. Id. at § 250 at 740.
58. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandaryfor Federal Courts, 24 DUQ.
L. REv. 741, 760 (1986) (entire hypothetical adopted from this source) [hereinafter Seidelson].
59. Id. at 760.
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The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors adopted the McCormick view in
State v. Tolisano. 60 In Tolisano, while searching the defendant's apartment for evi-
dence of illegal gambling, police answered twenty-five to thirty telephone calls.
The unknown callers asked for the defendant and placed a bet61 on a horse or
horses running that day. The court held that "the telephone calls [were] admissible
as evidence that bets were being placed but not that the statements made to the of-
ficers were true. The evidence [was] admitted, not as an exception to the hearsay
rule, but because it [was] not within the rule."62
The McCormick view will not find an utterance to be hearsay unless the propo-
nent of the utterance is trying to prove the truth of facts asserted in the utterance.
Since the bets in Tolisano were not being offered to prove the truth of facts asserted
in the bets but only to prove that bets were being placed, under the McCormick
view the bets are not hearsay.63
B. Federal Rules of Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 has been the subject of much scholarly debate and
inconsistent judicial treatment. The bulk of the debate stems from the advisory
committee note to Rule 801 (a) which seems to go well beyond the actual language
in the rule. The note provides that "[tihe effect of the definition of 'statement' is to
exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or
nonverbal, not intended as an assertion. The key to the definition is that nothing is
an assertion unless intended to be one."64 The note further states that verbal asser-
tions and nonverbal conduct intended to be assertive are hearsay.6" Finally, the
note asserts that (1) nonverbal conduct not intended as an assertion, (2) "nonasser-
tive verbal conduct," and (3) "verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a
basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted" are excluded from the
definition of hearsay by the language of 801 (c). 66 The rationale to support the
note's conclusion that these three types of conduct are not hearsay is that there is
less likelihood of fabrication and insincerity to justify the loss of the evidence on
hearsay grounds.67
The Federal Rules definition of hearsay is an assertion definition because it fo-
cuses on whether the declarant is making an assertion and "the purpose for which
the assertion is being offered in evidence." 68 The Federal Rules and the advisory
60. 70 A.2d 118 (1949).
61. An example of the bets taken by the police: "This is Al, Charlie; the Doc wants a $10.00 number hitch on
eight races at Saratoga." The court admitted the testimony not to establish the truth of the facts related by the
telephone calls but to establish the calls as verbal acts to show that the defendant was engaged in the activities
described in the information. Id. at 119.
62. Id. at 120 (citation omitted).
63. MCCoRIuCK, supra note 17, § 249 at 732-33.




68. Park, supra note 19, at 786.
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committee notes, however, do not explicitly deal with the hearsay status of im-
plied assertions from verbal conduct. The advisory committee notes, as stated
above, describe two categories of verbal conduct that are excluded from the defini-
tion of hearsay by Rule 801: (1) "nonassertive verbal conduct" and (2) "verbal con-
duct which is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the
matter asserted. "69
"The Advisory Committee Note's desire to have 'verbal conduct which is assert-
ive but offered as the basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted,
...excluded from the definition of hearsay' is . . .not well supported by the
Note's reasoning ...[and] not compelled by the language of Rule 801 . ... "70
The rule defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."71 The rule then defines a statement as "(1) an oral or written as-
sertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion."72 It is obvious that the advisory committee note contradicts the plain
language of the rule in excluding from the definition of hearsay verbal conduct
which is assertive but offered as the basis for inferring something other than the
matter asserted. The rule states that verbal assertions are hearsay but the advisory
committee notes state that some verbal assertions are not hearsay.
Courts reach contradictory results when trying to apply the rule and advisory
committee notes to verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as the basis for
inferring something other than the matter asserted.
The Eastern District Court of Kentucky in United States v. Zenni73 analyzed the
treatment of statements from unknown telephone callers under both the common
law and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court stated that "[a]t common law
this situation occupied a controversial no-man's land. "74 The McCormick view
would argue that the calls were not hearsay and the Morgan view would argue that
the calls were hearsay."s Under the Federal Rules of Evidence the court held that:
The utterances of the bettors telephoning in their bets were nonassertive verbal
conduct, offered as relevant for an implied assertion to be inferred from them,
namely that bets could be placed at the premises being telephoned. The language is
not an assertion on its face, and it is obvious these persons did not intend to make an
assertion about the fact sought to be proved or anything else.76
Relying on the advisory committee notes to Federal Rules of Evidence 801 (a) and
(c), the court concluded that "[s]ubdivision (a)(2) of Rule 801 removes implied
69. Id. at 794.
70. Seidelson, supr note 58, at 775.
71. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
72. FED. R. EvID. 801(a).
73. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
74. Id. at 466.
75. Id. at 466-67.
76. Id. at 469.
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assertions from the definition of statement and consequently from the operation of
the hearsay rule."77
There is no wording in the advisory committee note to support the Zenni court's
conclusion that implied assertions are removed from the definition of statement
and the operation of the hearsay rule. The Zenni court relied on the advisory com-
mittee language that the hearsay dangers of sincerity, perception, memory, and
narration are minimal in the absence of an intent to assert.7" For this reason the
court adopts the advisory committee language that "nonassertive verbal conduct
and verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something
other than the matter asserted, [are] also excluded from the definition of hearsay
by the language of subdivision (c).""
The unknown telephone callers in Zenni placed bets such as "[plut $2 to win on
Paul Revere in the third at Pimlico .... "0 Certainly, the words in the bet have
no relevance in themselves, but implicit in the bet is the proposition that the de-
fendant is running an illegal betting operation. The probative value of this bet is
dependent on the bettor's belief that the defendant is operating a betting establish-
ment, but the bettor is not available to be cross-examined.
The hearsay dangers of perception, narration/ambiguity, and sincerity are
present in the better's statement. The bettor "could have dialed incorrectly[,]
• ..could have been acting on the basis of incorrect declarations . . . made to
him by someone else [and] ...could have been an acquaintance of the [defend-
ant] who ...engaged in 'friendly' no-money-changes-hands betting .... 81
Cross-examination of the bettors would have revealed any one of those explana-
tions. 82
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Reynolds83 and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Lyle v. Koehler considered implied assertions under
the Federal Rules of Evidence and reached the opposite result of Zenni. In Rey-
nolds, when postal inspectors arrested one co-defendant on the street, he said to
another co-defendant, in the presence of arresting officers, "I didn't tell them any-
thing about you."85 Government prosecutors offered the statement to prove guilt
and argued it was not hearsay because the statement was not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.6 The court rejected the government's argument and
excluded the statement as hearsay since the only relevance of the statement to the
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. FED. R. EVID. 801 (a) advisory committee's note.
80. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 466 n.7.
81. Seidelson, supra note 58, at 767.
82. Id.
83. 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983).
84. 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983).
85. Reynolds, 715 F.2d at 101.
86. Id.
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case was tied to an assumed fact of the co-defendant's guilt that the prosecutor ar-
gued the statement proved. 7
In Lyle, law enforcement officials intercepted two letters written by one co-de-
fendant asking friends to testify to an alibi.88 The prosecution offered the letters to
show consciousness of guilt. 89 The court stated that "[u]nder Morgan's view, the
inference of Kemp's guilty mind, as reflected in the letters, is not severable from
Kemp's raw statements; the letters accordingly present a hearsay problem.""0
Thus, the court held that the letters were hearsay.
As a result of the contradictory results in Zenni, Reynolds, and Lyle, there is still
an issue of whether Federal Rule of Evidence 801 adopted the common law defimi-
tion of hearsay or changed the common law. "[Flew courts seem to believe Rule
801(c) changed the common law definition of hearsay. This conclusion is under-
standable because the rule's familiar truth-of-the-matter-asserted language often
was used at common law."91
IV. INSTANT CASES
A. United States v. Lewis
In Lewis92 , the question for review by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was
whether the district court erred by allowing a police officer to testify to questions
asked by an unidentified caller to Wade's beeper. 3 "Appellants argue[d] that while
the questions in [the telephone conversation were] not direct assertions, there are
certain assertions implicit in the questions."94 "[I]mplicit in the question 'Did you
get the stuff'?' is an assertion that [Lewis was] expecting to receive some 'stuff."I'
The court found that the caller's questions were not assertions and therefore not
87. Id. at 104.
88. Lyle, 720 F2d at 429.
89.Id. at 432.
90. Id. at 433.
91. Park, supra note 19, at 806.
92. 902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990).
93. The court also considered whether the postal inspectors violated Wade's fourth amendment rights by de-
taining the Express Mail package for an unreasonable time; whether Wade was denied effective assistance of
counsel; and whether there was sufficient evidence to support Wade's and Lewis' convictions. Id. at 1180.
94. Id. at 1179. Wade in reference to his fourth amendment claim argued that the postal inspectors should
have delivered the package on the afternoon of the day when the package was received instead of waiting until the
next morning. In support of his claims of denial of effective assistance by counsel, Wade contended "that his trial
counsel failed to move to suppress evidence obtained under the allegedly illegal search warrant, was unprepared
to make the proper argument on the legality of the search warrant at trial, was not personally present at his ar-
raignment hearing and failed to introduce the slippers as evidence that his story that he was expecting only slip-
pers was true." Id. at 1180.
95. Id. at 1179. Also implicit in the questions was that 'stuff was transported and that Wade and/or Lewis
were to transfer the "stuff" to the caller. "As to the question "Where is Dog?," it carries with it an assertion that
Dog (Wade) had some involvement with the caller and with the expected 'stuff. Wade argued that this conversa-
tion was offered by the prosecution to prove the truth of the matters impliedly asserted and was therefore inadmis-
sible. (Appellant Wade's Brief on Appeal at 9, United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990)(No.
89-4371)).
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hearsay.96 In support of its holding, the court relied on the advisory committee
notes of Rule 801 (a) and dicta from U.S. v. Groce97 that excluded implied asser-
tions from the coverage of the hearsay rule.98
B. United States v. Long
In Long,99 the question for review by the District of Columbia Circuit was
whether the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify to questions
asked by an unidentified telephone caller.100 Long argued that implicit in the con-
versation were assertions that Long had crack cocaine and that he sold it out of the
lessee's apartment. 101 He argued that "the government introduced this testimony to
prove the truth of precisely these assertions, and that the testimony, thus, should
have been excluded as hearsay."1"2
The court held that the calls fell outside the scope of the hearsay rule because
the caller's questions were nonassertive in that "Long [had] not provided any evi-
dence to suggest that the caller, through her questions, intended to assert that he
was involved in drug dealing." 03 In support of this holding, the court relied on the
advisory committee notes of Rule 801 (a) in pigeon-holing these calls as nonasser-
tive verbal conduct which is excluded from the hearsay rule under 801 (a). 104 This
96. Id. at 1179. The court also held that Wade's fourth amendment rights were not violated since the detention
of the Express Mail package was pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate and based on probable cause.
Wade's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on direct appeal since the claim had not
been raised befbre the district court and no opportunity existed to develop the record on the merits of the allega-
tions. Finally, however, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Wade's conviction. Id. at 1180-
81.
97. 682 F.2d 1359, 1364 (11 th Cir. 1982). This case involved the admissibility of nautical maps with pencil
markings that expert testimony opined were relevant in that the maps and markings indicate that the defendants
had the means to accomplish the conspiracy, and were subject to the inference that they had intent. The court
resolved this issue by holding that the nautical maps and pencil markings were not assertions and therefore not
hearsay. This case had nothing to do with implied verbal assertions. Id. at 1364.
98. Lewis, 902 F.2d at 1179.
99. 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
100. Long, 905 F.2d at 1579. The court also addressed the issues of whether there was sufficient evidence to
support Long's conviction for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, whether May-
field had filed a timely notice of appeal, and whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Long's
motion to sever his trial from Mayfield's. Id. at 1574-80.
101. Id. at 1579.
102. Id. Other arguments on appeal included Mayfield's argument that the district court implicitly granted her
a thirty-day extension to file an appeal by "accepting" her untimely notice of appeal. Also, Long argued that the
evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support a jury finding that he "used or carried" a firearm to support
his conviction. Finally, Long argued that the evidence against Mayfield was far more damning than that against
him, and therefore the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever his trial from hers. Id. at
1576-80.
103. Id. at 1580. The court also remanded Mayfield's case to the district court for a determination of whether
she should be granted a thirty-day extension permitted by FED. R. OF APp. P. 4(b). Id. at 1575. In addressing
Long's firearm conviction, the court held "that the government failed to provide any evidence to support a reason-
able inference that Long 'used' the revolver" and therefore reversed his firearm conviction. Id. at 1576. Finally,
the court held that "[t]his case [involved] nowhere near the 'gross disparity' of evidence required before [it is held]
that a district court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to sever." Id. at 1581.
104. Id. at 1580.
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court also relied on dicta from U.S. v. Groce'15 that states that implied assertions
are not hearsay. 108
V. ANALYSIS
A. Hearsay and Implied Assertions
Lewis and Long involve classic verbal implied assertion issues under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801 and its accompanying advisory committee notes. Both cases
involve the admissibility of evidence of telephone calls between one unknown
caller and a police officer. In Lewis, the unknown caller placed a telephone call to
the defendant's beeper number only to have the call intercepted and returned by
the police officer.1"7 Whereas in Long, a telephone call was made to a telephone
number not listed in the defendant's name but purportedly asking for the defendant
by his first name. 08 The courts in Lewis and Long admitted the calls over hearsay
objections on the theory that "[tihe questions asked by the unknown caller, like
most questions and inquiries, are not hearsay because they do not, and were not
intended to, assert anything."" 9 In both Lewis and Long, the incriminating tele-
phone calls were the primary evidence to support the defendants' convictions.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as "a statement other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."' The Fifth Circuit in Lewis concluded
that the Federal Rules definition is an assertion definition, because the Rule fo-
cuses on whether an assertion is made and the purpose for which the assertion is
offered. 1 However, the Fifth Circuit then cited Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary for the proposition that "[w]hile 'assertion' is not defined in the rule,
the term has the connotation of a positive declaration."'12 "Under [the Federal
Rules] definition, an out-of-court utterance is hearsay [only] if it is an assertion
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 13 To say that an utterance is of-
fered as an implied assertion
means that the trier is being asked to infer that fact from the declarant's utterance.
The utterance containing the implied assertion does not directly assert the proposi-
tion it is offered to prove. The trier must infer the proposition by using the utterance
as indirect evidence of a belief or state of mind of the declarant. 
1 4
105. 682 F.2d 1359, 1364 (1 th Cir. 1982).
106. Long, 905 F.2d at 1580.
107. "[The police officer] then tried to arrange a meeting with the unknown caller, but no one showed up at the
appointed rendezvous." Lewis, 902 F.2d at 1179.
108. Long, 905 F.2d at 1580.
109. Lewis, 902 F.2d at 1179 (citations omitted).
110. FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
111. Lewis, 902 F.2d at 1179.
112. Id.
113. Park, supra note 19, at 786.
114. Id. at 788.
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In Lewis, the unknown caller's utterances were "[did you get the stuff?." and
"[w]here is Dog?"' " In Long, the unknown caller asked to speak with "Keith" and
asked if Keith "still had any stuff." When asked what she meant she responded, "a
fifty," and she finally asked whether "Mike" could come around to pick up the
"fifty."'' 6 These utterances standing alone are useless and irrelevant and should be
inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 401. 17 However, if the utterances in
Lewis are considered for the assertions implicit in the questions that Wade was ex-
pecting to receive stuff (cocaine), and the utterances in Long are considered for the
assertions implicit in the statements that Long had crack cocaine and sold it, then
the assertions are relevant evidence.
If helpfulness depends on the trier's belief that the declarant intended to assert a fact
that supports the proponent's case, then the court should consider the statement
hearsay under the truth-of-the-matter-asserted definition .... This result makes
sense because no difference in hearsay dangers exists between a direct and an indi-
rect accusation. Under this approach, therefore, the court does not determine actual
intent. Instead, it traces the path the trier would take in drawing inferences favorable
to the proponent.' 18
The courts in Lewis and Long did not discuss the relevance of the utterances for
the purpose for which they were being admitted. Instead, they simply just made
conclusionary rulings that the utterances were not assertions since the unknown
callers did not intend to make assertions. Therefore, the courts concluded the ut-
terances were not hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801. There is no doubt
the utterances in both cases were only relevant for the truth of the matter impliedly
asserted in them. There is also no doubt that the relevance of the utterances de-
pends on the jury's belief that the declarant intended to assert a fact that supports
the proponent's case.
In Park v. Huff, Judge Wisdom's majority opinion for the Fifth Circuit stated,
"[w]hen the possibility is real that an out-of-court statement which implies the ex-
istence of the ultimate fact in issue was made with assertive intent, it is essential
that the statement be treated as hearsay if a direct declaration of that fact would be
so treated."" If the unknown caller in Lewis stated that Wade received cocaine,
and if the unknown caller in Long stated that Long was distributing cocaine, both
of these statements would be hearsay and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801 subject to the hearsay exceptions. The hearsay dangers of perception,
memory, narration and sincerity are present to the same extent in the implied as-
sertions as well as in the direct statements. To hold otherwise is to adopt a position
directly opposing the common law position on implied assertions set forth in
115. Lewis, 902 F.2d at 1179.
116. Long, 905 F.2d at 1579.
117." 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con-
sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
118. Park, supra note 19, at 800.
119. 493 E2d 923,928 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Wright v. Tatham. 12 If the drafters of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 intended to
adopt a rule that overturns 200 years of common law precedent, the plain language
of the Rule does not accomplish their intention. The overturning of 200 years of
common law by the Eastern District Court of Kentucky in United States v. Zenni121
therefore, "stands as a landmark for any court wishing to conclude that the Federal
Rules assertion definition leads to a different result from Wright v. Ta-
tham ... ,"122
The Fifth Circuit in effect overrules Park in its Lewis decision but does not even
discuss this fact. The Fifth Circuit could have used the same reasoning as the court
in People v. Scalzi. 12 In Scalzi, the California First District Court of Appeals held
that evidence of telephone calls intercepted by a police officer during a drug arrest
were hearsay. 124 The facts of Scalzi were similar to Lewis and Long in that one call
from an unknown caller was intercepted. The unknown caller asked for the de-
fendant, even though it was not the defendant's house, and then asked if the defend-
ant "had taken care of business" which the caller explained to mean whether the
defendant had gotten the drugs bagged up. 121
The case law discussed throughout this note "shows first that the Supreme
Court has not written about the implied assertion problem .. . .[However],
[s]catteredlower court cases [have] specifically consider[ed] the implied asser-
tion issue. " 21 As this note indicates, "[s]ince [the] enactment of the Federal Rules
in 1975, a handful of courts have expressly adopted or rejected the position that
implied assertions are hearsay."
127
The plain language of Rule 801 supports the position of courts that conclude
that verbal implied assertions are hearsay. By combining Rule 801(a) and 801(c),
any oral assertion, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, is hearsay if offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted. Rule 801 does not require that only oral assertions offered to prove the
truth of the matter explicitly asserted are hearsay while an oral assertion offered to
prove the truth of the matter implicitly asserted is non-hearsay. Courts that at-
tempt to draw such a distinction while relying on the advisory committee notes to
support the distinction are in error. The advisory committee notes exceed the
scope of the plain language of Rule 801.
B. Co-conspirator Exception to Hearsay
A conclusion that the questions in the Lewis and Long telephone calls were
hearsay does not permanently exclude the admissibility of the questions. Federal
120. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch. 1837).
121. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
122. Park, supra note 19, at 811.
123. 126 Cal. App. 3d901 (1981).
124. Id. at 907.
125. Id. at 905-06.
126. Park, supra note 19, at 826.
127. Id.
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Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(E) is a hearsay exemption which states that "[a] state-
ment is not hearsay if . . . [tlhe statement is offered against a party and is ...a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. ' 128 Before admitting a co-conspirator's statements under Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), there must be evidence of a conspiracy involving the
declarant and the defendant, and the statement must be made in the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 29 Admissibility is a preliminary question for the
court under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a). 30 The offering party must prove the
preliminary facts of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence.' 3' In mak-
ing a preliminary fact determination under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E), the court may examine the hearsay statement sought to be admit-
ted. 132
In Lewis, Wade was convicted of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute. 133 Therefore, the court could evaluate the hearsay questions from the
unknown telephone caller under the co-conspirator exemption test set forth in
Bouraily v. United States. '34 The critical issue in applying this test in Lewis is
whether there was evidence to link the telephone caller declarant and Wade to the
conspiracy for which Wade was convicted. If the unknown caller was a co-con-
spirator under the Bouraily test, then the hearsay questions would be admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). If the unknown caller was not a co-
conspirator under the Bourjaily test, then the hearsay questions would not be ad-
missible unless another hearsay exemption is applicable.
In Long, even though Long was not convicted of a conspiracy, the hearsay ques-
tions still must be evaluated under the co-conspirator exemption to the hearsay
rule. The questions should be evaluated under the Bourjaily co-conspirator ex-
emption test, and the result of this analysis would be the same as the result under
the Lewis analysis.
C. Confrontation Clause Implications
Holding as the courts did in Lewis and Long that the utterances from the un-
known telephone callers were not hearsay, the courts failed to analyze the utter-
ances against the defendants' confrontation clause rights. The court's failure to do
128. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
129. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
130. Id. at 178.
Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be
a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
131. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 176.
132. Id. at 181.
133. Lewis, 902 F.2d at 1181.
134. A co-conspirator statement may be admitted under the exception if there is evidence of a conspiracy in-
volving the declarant and the defendant, and the statement is made in the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy. Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 177-78.
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so is a violation of the defendants' constitutional rights. Under the sixth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him . . 135
In Lewis, Wade presented an argument that his confrontation clause rights were
violated by admission of the incriminating telephone calls against him. "The pur-
pose of the Confrontation Clause is to promote the accuracy of the truth-seeking
process in criminal trials by assuring that the 'trier of fact has a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth' of an out-of-court statement."136 However, the court did
not address the proposed argument.
Ohio v. Roberts3' establishes the test for confrontation clause analysis of hear-
say statements.
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Con-
frontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability
can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least ab-
sent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.1
38
The "indicia of reliability" portion of the Ohio v. Roberts confrontation clause
test would fail under both Lewis and Long. The unavailability of the declarant por-
tion of the test can be satisfied as long as good faith efforts were undertaken prior
to trial to locate and present the unknown callers.' 39 Since the questions by the un-
known telephone callers were not analyzed and admitted under the co-conspirator
exemption, which is a deeply rooted hearsay exception, the admissibility of the
questions would most likely violate the defendant's confrontation clause rights. It
is difficult to see how unknown callers could qualify for any showing of a particu-
larized guarantee of trustworthiness.
It is impossible in Lewis and Long to establish the sincerity and perception of
the unknown callers. The calls could have been set ups. There is no corroboration
through other calls to establish the trustworthiness of the unknown caller. There is
no other evidence establishing that the calls were the defendants' normal mode of
operation which would satisfy any showing of particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness of the callers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lewis and Long suggest that the definition of hearsay in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(c) has sometimes has led courts to classify utterances as non-hearsay
135. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
136. Appellant Wade's Brief on Appeal at 12, United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1178-80 n.3 (5th Cir.
1990)(No. 89-437 1) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
137. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
138. Id. at66.
139. Id. at 74.
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despite the presence of obvious hearsay dangers. The statements made and ques-
tions asked by the unknown telephone callers in Lewis and Long were oral asser-
tions within the definition of a statement under Rule 801(a). Furthermore, the
statements made and questions asked by the unknown telephone callers were of-
fered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter impliedly asserted in them. Rule
801(c) does not exclude verbal implied assertions from the hearsay rule, and the
contradictory advisory committee notes should not be construed to remedy any
defect in Rule 801.
"The defects of Federal Rule [of Evidence] 801 cannot be eliminated satisfacto-
rily through judicial construction. Indeed, one of the worst features of the rule is
its susceptibility to various interpretations." 4 Because of the defects in Federal
Rule of Evidence 801 and the conflicting precedents of the various federal circuit
courts of appeal interpreting the Rule, there is a need to adopt some changes to the
Rule. The changes should be geared toward making hearsay analysis more uni-
form and consistent with the holding in Wright v. Tatham and its common law ap-
proach toward verbal hearsay. Many commentators agree with Professor Morgan
"that the rational basis for the hearsay classification is not the formula, 'assertions
offered for the truth of the matter asserted,' but rather the presence of substantial
risks of insincerity and faulty narration, memory, and perception[J" 141 The fact
that the utterance of the out-of-court declarant is not under oath and subject to
cross-examination makes the declarant's utterance susceptible to hearsay dangers.
It should not matter whether the utterance is a direct verbal assertion or an implied
verbal assertion.
If the unknown caller in Long had stated directly that the defendant had crack
cocaine and that he sold it, the statement would be excluded as hearsay since it is a
direct verbal assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Why
should the hearsay rule be circumvented when the unknown caller asks if the de-
fendant has a "fifty" and whether someone could come by to pick it up?142 The
questions clearly reveal assumptions that are the functional equivalent of the direct
assertion. Both the direct assertion and the implied assertion contain hearsay dan-
gers which justify the exclusion of the evidence on hearsay grounds.
Professor Wellborn, " who served as Reporter of the State Bar of Texas Liaison
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence recommends two ways of changing
the hearsay rule.
One way of making the change would be to amend Rule 801(c) to provide that all
verbal expressions whose probative value depends on the declarant's credibility are
hearsay. Another way would be to amend Rule 801(c) to define as hearsay any ver-
bal expression offered as evidence of the declarant's belief in a matter, to prove the
140. Wellborn, supm note 30, at 92.
141. Morgan, supra note 22, at 218.
142. Long, 905 F.2d at 1579.
143. Professor of Law, the University of Texas. A.B. 1970, J.D. 1973, Harvard University.
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matter believed. Either form of revision would codify the doctrine of Wright v. Ta-
tham1A as it applies to verbal conduct.1 4
Professor Wellborn proposes the following minor changes to Federal Rule of
Evidence 801:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written verbal expression or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person if it is intended by him as a communication.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered as evidence ofdeclarant's be-
lief in a matter, to prove the matter believed. "
Under this proposed change to Federal Rule of Evidence 801, the rule would
trigger on communication, instead of assertion and thus eliminate the ambiguity in
the present rule. This rule would also codify the Wright v. Tatham common law
hearsay rule for verbal conduct but at the same time continue to exclude nonverbal
nonassertive conduct from the definition of hearsay. Applying Wellborn's pro-
posed rule would result in a more uniform analysis of hearsay evidence while codi-
fying the common law rule. The questions in Lewis and Long were offered as
evidence of the declarant's belief that Wade was to receive cocaine and that Long
was to distribute crack cocaine in order to prove that Wade and Long were in-
volved in illegal drug activities. Therefore, the questions from both of the tele-
phone calls should be considered hearsay and inadmissible unless there is an
applicable hearsay exception or exemption.
James M. Ulam
144. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch. 1837).
145. Park, supm note 19, at 829-30.
146. Wellborn, supra note 30, at 92.
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